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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
WOODROW WILLIE JOHN, Case No. 18108 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
-
This is an appeal from a conviction for Attempted Rape, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
402 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Woodrow Willie John, was charged in an 
Information with Attempted Rape, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended), and with Forcible 
Sexual Abuse, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-404 (1953 as amended). On the 15th day of October, 
1981, the appellant was convicted by·a jury of Attempted Rape. 
On the 26th day of October, 1981, the appellant was sentenced 
to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, Woodrow Willie John, seeks to have the 
judgment entered against him vacated, or reversed and remanded 
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATE:MENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 9, 1981, Ruth Robinson 
was getting into her car in a parking lot near 200 West South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, when she was accosted by an individual 
who slid into the car with her. The individual made sexual 
advances on Mrs. Robinson, until he was interrupted by a young 
man walking through the parking lot who saw and heard the struggle 
going on in the car. The young man watched as the assailant 
exited the car and walked away, while Mrs. Robinson locked the 
doors and windows, started the car, and began pulling away in 
such a frenzied state that" she almost had an accident. The 
young man stopped Mrs. Robinson, then asked two other individuals 
in the parking lot to summon the police, which they did. 
(T. 9-17, 52-55) 
Later that evening, Mrs. Robinson was driven to the St. 
Mark's Half-Way House by a police officer. The appellant was 
brought out of the facility by a police officer, where Mrs. 
Robinson could see him. She could not make a positive identification, 
so the officer took her to within 4 or 5 feet of the appellant. 
She was still uncertain, and asked that the appellant say something. 
When the appellant used the word "lady", as had Mrs. Robinson's 
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assailant, she said she was sure this was the person. (T. 26-
28, 90-91) Defense counsel moved to strike the in court identification 
of the appellant by Mrs. Robinson because it was tainted by 
the prior suggestive show-up. The motion was denied. (T. 101, 
105) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF RUTH ROBINSON. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed. 2d 401 (1972), 
the unreliability of unduly suggestive eyewitness identification 
procedures. The court indicated five factors important in assessing 
the likelihood of misidentification: 
The opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' 
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' 
prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199 
The authorities agree that eyewitness identification 
is a highly unreliable source of evidence at best, 1 and 
1. See Buckhout, "Eyewitness Testimony", 231 Scientific American 
23 (1974); Buckhout, "Psychology and Eyewitness Testimony", 
2 Law and Psych. Rev. 75 (1976); Doob & Kirshenbaum, "Bias in 
Police Line-ups--Partial Remembering'', 1 J. of Police Science 
and Admin. 287 (1973), Loftus, "Reconstructing Memory: The 
Incredible Eyewitness", 15 Jurimetrics J. 188 (1975): Murray 
"The Criminal Line-Up at Home and Abroad", Utah 1, Rev. 610 
(1966) n.2. 
-3-
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subsequent studies have shown that the reliability of eyewitness 
identification is poor even where all five of the Neil v. Biggers 
factors are optimal. 2 But in the present case, two of the five 
factors would indicate a high unreliability of Mrs. Robinson's 
identification of the appellant as her assailant. The five 
factors as applied to the present case are as follows: 
1. Mrs. Robinson's opportunity to observe her assailant 
was very good, because she was with him for several minutes 
in broad daylight at a close proximity~ 
2. Mrs. Robinson's degree of attention to her assailant 
would have been very high, since the incident involved an attach 
on her person. 
3. Mrs. Robinson's description of her assailant was 
a poor match with the appellant. She described her assailant 
as 250-300 pounds, more than 100 pounds heavier than the appellant's 
weight; she said her assailant was wearing a red T-shirt, while 
the appellant was found wearing a flannel shirt a short time 
later, and no evidence was introduced that the appellant even 
owned a red T-shirt; and Mrs. Robinson remembered her assailant 
2. See Uelman, "Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers: 
An Experiment in Eyewitness Identification", 16 Crim. Law Bulletin 
358 (1980). 
-4-
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as wearing his hair differently than did the appellant. (T. 
26' 44) 
4. Mrs. Robinson was not at all certain as to her identification~ 
even after she viewed the appellant from a few feet away in 
a one-on-one show-up. 
5. The time elapsed between the event and the identification 
was only a matter of hours. 
It can be seen that, under the Neil v. Biggers analysis 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the present identification 
was very weak on two of five points. Furthermore, the identification 
was made under the most suggestive of circumstances possible--
the witness was shown a person already in the custody of the 
police and, knowing him to be the only suspect in the case, 
could only make a very tentative initial identification, until 
the person happened to say the word "lady", a very common means 
of addressing adult females. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed its own concern 
with suggestive identification procedures. In State v. Ervin, 
22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P.2d 372 (Utah 1969), the court stated: 
We are in accord with the idea that a line-up should 
be neither so devised nor manipulated as to impel 
or to be unduly suggestive as to identification. 
Ideally it should be regarded as having a dual 
purpose. On the one hand: to help in searching 
out and identifying those guilty of crime. On 
the other, the equally important corollary: to 
protect those who are suspected of crime but who 
are innocent. To best serve both purposes the 
procedure should be handled with caution not to 
place blame on the innocent, and yet not so laden 
with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions 
as to make it impractical as a method of identifying 
the guilty. 451 P.2d at 374-75 
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And finally, in an apparent effort to serve the "dual 
purpose" of the line-up procedure, the Legislature drafted Chapter 
8 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in 1980, outlining 
the circumstances and procedures for conducting line-ups. An 
arrested suspect may be required by a peace officer to appear 
in a line-up - - otherwise, a magis.trate' s order is required 
3 
upon a finding of probable cause. Section 77-8-2 assures the 
suspect of the right to have counsel present at the line-up, 
and Section 77-8-4 requires the entire procedure to be recorded, 
allowing the suspect access to such records. And, perhaps most 
importantly in the present case, Section 77-8-3 forbids peace 
officers from "attempt[ing] to influence the identification 
of any particular suspect." 
None of the statutory requirements of Chapter 8 were 
followed in the present instance. The appellant was not arrested 
and in custody at the time of the show-up, nor had any magistrate's 
order issued. No counsel was present, the appellant had no 
opportunity to procure counsel, nor was he even made aware of 
any such right. No record was made of the proceedings. And 
finally, the entire purpose of bringing Mrs. Robinson to the 
St. Mark's facility was to get her to confirm the officer's 
choice of the appellant as her assailant. The police literally 
pointed out the man they wanted Mrs. Robinson to identify. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §77-8-1 (1953 as amended) 
-6-
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The requirements of Chapter 8 are clear, and the failure 
to comply with them in the present instance is equally clear. 
The opportunity to comply with Chapter 8 was also present --
there were no special or exigent circumstances requiring an 
innnediate identification. 
If compliance with Chapter 8 is not required in the present 
instance, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where the 
police could not circumvent Chapter 8 in the same manner as 
in the case at bar. Whenever the police wished to conduct a 
suggestive show-up, avoiding the admittedly more burdensome 
but more reliable Chapter 8 procedure, they could merely bring 
the purported eyewitness along when they make the arrest, and 
have the witness "identify" the individual before the arrest 
is made. Such a reading of Chapter 8 would make its provisions 
meaningless, and effective only as a suggestion -- i.e.·' the 
police may comply with Chapter 8 only if they so choose. 
Since the police chose not to comply with Chapter 8 in 
the case at bar, and have shown no exigency requiring non-compliance, 
the appellant's motion to strike the identification testimony 
of Mrs. Robinson was improperly denied by the trial court. The 
lower court's decision should be reversed. 
-7-
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POINT IL~ 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient 
to support the verdict rendered. The standard for reviewing 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was stated by 
this Court in State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272, 1272 (Utah 1975): 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 
conviction, it must appear that viewing the evidence 
and all inferences that may reasonbly be drawn 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside 
a verdict it must appear that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds acting fairly must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that defendant committed the crime. 
Applying _this standard to the present case, the identification 
of the appellant by Mrs. Robinson was "so inconclusive [and] 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds . must have entertained 
reasonable doubt" as to whether or not the appellant was Mrs. 
Robinson's assailant. 
The inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony must 
be taken into consideration. Reasonable persons do not unduly 
rely on unreliable evidence. The fact that Mrs. Robinson's 
testimony failed to comply with two of the five Neil v. Biggers 
criteria adds to its unreliability. 
The failure of Mrs. Robinson's description of her assailant 
to match the physical size of the appellant, together with her 
uncertainty as to her visual identification of the appellant, 
her undue reliance on the appellant's use of the word "lady", 
and the complete absence of physical evidence identifvina rno 
n 
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appellant as the assailant, all would lead a reasonable juror 
to entertain reasonable doubts as to the identification. . For 
this reason the conviction should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to strike Ruth Robinson's 
identificatin testimony, because of the use of unnecessarily 
suggestive identification p:c-ocedures by t.he .1'olic~, in violation 
of the appellant's due process . :r:.ights under the Constitution 
and in violation of Chapter 8 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Furthermore, the eyewitness identification of the appellant 
by Ruth Robinson was so fraught with unreliability and uncertainty 
that a reasonable juror could not have found the appellant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The case should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this J 7 day of September, 1982. 
J / ,,··? 
r;-< wh .'°"JMOWN ;';:_ /:f A.A'?.6--<~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of September, 1982. 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
